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Abstract
Previous studies of share repurchase have primarily focused on examining announcement 
effects and long-term operating performance in order to distinguish among the diverse pos­
sible hypotheses for repurchase. One of the most important rationales they have studied is 
the over-investment hypothesis: firms repurchase in order to avoid investing in negative net 
present value projects. While the recent empirical analyses have presented some indirect 
evidence in support of the over-investment hypothesis, this study examines this rationale 
for repurchase from a unique perspective, empirically showing that project returns have an 
important influence on the decision to repurchase shares. Our sample of firms consists of 
125 real estate investment trusts (REITs) in order to utilize a time series of real estate 
capitalization rates (property ROAs) from market transactions on different property types. 
These cap rates proxy for a REIT’s project opportunity set. Using a both Logit and Tobit 
models that corrects for other possible buyback rationales, we show that during periods with 
relatively low cap rates, REITs are more likely to both repurchase shares and repurchase 
larger amounts of shares than when cap rates are high.
* Corresponding author. KMEC Suite 9-190, 44 W 4th St, New York, NY 10012. email 
wboudry@stern.nyu.edu.
1 Introduction
Share repurchase has been an active area of financial research for the last four decades. It 
has also been increasingly significant in global financial markets. For example, in 1999, for 
the first time in history, the dollar volume of share repurchase exceeded the total amount of 
dividends paid by U.S. firms.1 In addition, regulators in foreign markets have been relaxing 
restrictions on buybacks, leading to the rapid growth of repurchase outside the U.S.2
The majority of academic investigations into stock repurchase (these are briefly covered 
in the literature review in Section 2) examine the short-term and long-term impact of the 
repurchase. These papers typically test theoretical buyback motives by employing an event 
study and/or a measurement of after-repurchase performance (either operating performance 
or abnormal stock returns). A number of more recent studies have used Logit and Tobit 
analyses to assess the determinants of the repurchase decision.
One of the most cited motives for repurchase is the lack of attractive investment oppor­
tunities relative to the firm's cash position; this is usually referred to as the over-investment 
motive or hypothesis. While the academic studies have shed considerable light on the empir­
ical validity of potential motives for repurchase, they have presented only indirect evidence 
addressing this important interaction between the firm's repurchase decision and the return 
on its investment opportunities. The most recent studies have generally supported the over­
investment hypothesis, but the evidence is indirect. This is due to the obvious difficulty 
in determining the firm’s return on its possible projects. While these returns are available 
to firm insiders, they are not easily observable by researchers. This study more directly 
attacks this essential aspect of the repurchase question by estimating the firm’s expected 
project returns in order to determine the extent to which these project returns influence the 
repurchase decision.
1See Julio and Ikenberry (2004).
2See Kim, Schremper, and Varaiya (2005) for a description of the changing foreign restrictions.
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We achieve this objective by focusing on Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). While 
this is a significant restriction and potentially limits the generality of our results it has a 
very powerful advantage: it allows us to use available data on capitalization rates (project 
ROAs) from observed market transactions on different property types to proxy for the REIT’s 
project opportunity set. REITs were established in 1960 to allow retail investors to invest in 
commercial and other forms of real estate. Because they are restricted to passive real estate 
investment and because they are required to pass on 90% of taxable income as dividends,3 
REITs are essentially tax-free investment conduits.4 The reason for using REITs is that they 
are among the most transparent investment vehicles, and because of the restrictions on their 
allowable investments, we can use a diverse database of market transactions to determine 
cap rates, which we then use to estimate the REIT’s feasible project returns at any point in 
time. Another advantage of using REITs in our study is that there are relatively few hostile 
REIT mergers.5 This virtually eliminates the use of repurchases as an anti-takeover device.6 
Finally, restricting our analysis to one industry avoids the confounding influence of varying 
levels of risk.
While a more precise definition is given in Section 3, informally one can think of the cap­
italization rate as being the property’s Return on Assets. We obtain cap rates on 101,594 
transactions with a total transaction value of $1.05 trillion over the period 1995 to 2008 
from the CoStar and Real Capital Analytics databases. Our empirical analysis uses these 
transactions to create a time series of project returns for each of the 125 REITs in our sam­
ple. We then examine the relation between repurchase activity and project returns. The 
over-investment hypothesis asserts that REITs will be more likely to repurchase shares when
3See Boudry (2009) for an analysis of REIT dividend payout policy. This paper essentially shows that 
REIT managers set dividends so as to minimize the tax burden of their investors. See also Hardin and Hill 
(2008).
4 There is thus some difficulty in translating the typical motives for dividends versus repurchase as dis­
cussed in several studies of regular corporations; for example Grullon and Michaely (2002).
5There have been very few exceptions; see however Panovka (2007).
6See Bagwell (1991).
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project returns are relatively low, since this action would maximize shareholder value. Over­
all our data are strongly consistent with this hypothesis. A one standard deviation decrease 
in capitalization rates makes the REITs in our sample 6% more likely to repurchase shares. 
This same decrease in capitalization rates leads to an increase in the level of repurchases of 
21 b.p. of total assets, or approximately one quarter of the average level of repurchases ob­
served in the sample. Since REITs have essentially no internal capital available for financing 
projects, one would expect that these results would be even stronger for typical corporations, 
which have far less dependence on external capital markets.
The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a very 
brief overview of the academic literature most related to our objectives. Section 3 describes 
the data and empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 
concludes.
2 Literature Review
This section provides a brief review of the extensive academic literature on share repurchase, 
emphasizing those papers that are most relevant to the current study. A comprehensive 
treatment is presented in Allen and Michaely (2002).
2.1 Survey Results
Wansley, Lane, and Sarkar (1989) present survey data on the motives for share repurchase.7 
They list six possible motives: (i) Repurchase can act as a substitute for dividend payments: 
firms may view both dividends and repurchase as alternative mechanisms for distributing 
cash to shareholders; the firm could prefer one mechanism over another because of tax,
7See also Baker, Gallagher, and Morgan (1981).
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signaling implications etc.8 (ii) As a method to adjust leverage: repurchase will increase the 
firm’s leverage and potentially give insiders more control of the firm. (iii) To provide shares 
for reissue (e.g., for option exercise). (iv) Because of a lack of investment opportunities or an 
excess of available cash. (v) To signal favorable information about the firm’s prospects or to 
signal that insiders view the shares as undervalued (thus this is termed the under-valuation 
hypothesis).9 (vi) To transfer wealth to selling shareholders.10 The strongest agreement 
from survey respondents was for (v), (ii) and (iv).
Point (iv) is the focus of this study. The idea is that as a firm matures or as market 
conditions change, its investment opportunities can diminish and/or its cash flows increase. 
Some firms, in order to maximize shareholder value, would then elect to buy back shares 
rather than invest in negative net present value projects.11
More recently, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) surveyed 348 financial ex­
ecutives with regard to their perspectives on dividends and share repurchase. Among their 
key findings relating to repurchase were the following: repurchase decisions are made after 
investment decisions are undertaken; firms are concerned with the impact of repurchase on 
EPS;12 firms opt to repurchase when they hold excess cash or have a lack of good investment 
opportunities. The last of these three points is most relevant to this paper.
A motivation not directly addressed in these early survey papers is the agency motive. 
A related area of particular academic interest is the interaction between repurchase and
8Guay and Harford (2000) also analyze the role that permanent versus transitory cash flow shocks play 
in this decision.
9Some studies, e.g., Kahle (2002), refer to the latter as the free cash flow theory.
10 A number of studies also address the tax issues of repurchase versus dividends as a means of returning 
capital to investors; these papers date back to Bierman and West (1966) and Elton and Gruber (1967). See 
also Bagwell and Shoven (1989). This issue is more complex for REITs since their dividends do not qualify 
for the usual favorable dividend tax treatment.
11The recent $15 billion repurchase plans announced by IBM illustrate this point. According to one source 
(v3.co.uk): “On the surface the decision may seem to be a positive one for shareholders, but on the flipside 
this essentially means that IBM has nothing better to spend the money on than trying to raise the share 
price by financial machinations rather than by selling more product.”
12Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong (2003) study the relation between repurchase and EPS. They find that 
managers tend to increase buybacks in order to maintain a target rate of EPS growth.
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executive option compensation; these issues will be discussed further below.
2.2 Repurchase: Theoretical Background
This section reviews some of the most relevant theoretical papers in order to frame our 
econometric analysis. Since repurchase and dividends can be viewed as substitutes,13 many 
of the theoretical arguments that address dividend policy can be applied to share repurchase 
as well. These include the early signaling models of Bhattacharya (1979), Vermaelen (1984), 
Miller and Rock (1985) and Ofer and Thakor (1987). Broadly stated, these asymmetric 
information models imply that dividends and share repurchase are credible signals of the 
firm’s future prospects. Thus, the signaling hypothesis will imply that share repurchase is a 
signal of future over performance. A  closely related theory, which has considerable support 
from the above survey results, is the under-valuation hypothesis. This is another version 
of the asymmetric information story. Managers have superior knowledge about their firm’s 
true value and repurchase their shares when the market under values the firm.
The parallel between dividend theories and repurchase also applies to the diverse agency 
cost arguments. From the earliest, Jensen (1986), these papers have focused on dividends 
and repurchase as a solution to the over-investment problem. These payouts reduce divert- 
ible cash flow and mitigate managements’ incentives to invest in negative net present value 
projects. As noted above, we refer to this as the over-investment hypothesis.
Finally, there are a number of papers (e.g. Kahle (2002)) that deal with the darker 
motives for repurchase. It is possible that insiders can use their valuable private information 
to time repurchase decisions to, for example, maximize the value of their performance-based 
compensation or to engage in profitable insider trading.
13This exchange of repurchase for dividends is in fact dubbed the substitution hypothesis; see Grullon and 
Michaely (2002).
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The early empirical work focused on the market reaction to the announcement of open- 
market and tender offer repurchases. The earliest papers, Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1981) 
and Bartov (1991) supported the signaling story. They showed that the announcement effects 
were strongly positive, and that long-term returns were also positive, partially because of 
EPS growth. This point was further refined in Nohel and Tarhan (1998), which showed that 
the EPS gain came from high book-to-market firms, consistent with the over-investment 
hypothesis.14 Dittmar (2000) and others have provided significant support for the under­
valuation hypothesis.
The more recent literature favors the over-investment hypothesis over the signaling story. 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), Guay and Harford (2000) and Jagannathan 
and Stephens (2003) show a decline in earnings after the repurchase. However, Lie (2005) 
correcting for pre-repurchase performance, attributes much of this decrease to mean rever­
sion. These results are generally robust when applied to non-U.S. data. See, e.g., Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000) and Rau and Vermaelen (2002).15
A twist on the agency implications of buybacks is developed in Kahle (2002), which stud­
ies how the structure of employee stock options influences repurchase behavior, suggesting 
that the recent growth in repurchase activity could be a result of the great increases in ex­
ecutive option compensation. She further finds that the presence of executive options leads 
to greater buyback activity.16 Related work on the market timing ability evidenced by Hong 
Kong stock buybacks is found in Brockman and Chung (2001).
An important issue in open-market repurchases is the extent to which firms actually buy
14Lie (2005), using data for 1981-2000, estimated announcement effects for open-market repurchase aver­
aging 3.0%, a figure that is comparable to the initial studies.
15The latter paper suggests that the U.K.’s stricter regulatory environment dampens the adverse informa­
tion effect, making short- and long-term abnormal returns lower than the figures found in comparable U.S. 
studies.
16See also Fenn and Liang (2001).
2.3 Repurchases: Empirical Results
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back the stated number of shares. Recent evidence, e.g., Lie (2005), has shown that actual 
repurchase, rather than merely the announcement of an open market repurchase program, 
leads to superior operating performance after the repurchase.
2.4 REIT Repurchases
A  recent paper that tries to disentangle the various motives for repurchase in the case of 
REITs is Brau and Holmes (2006). This study analyzes the cumulative abnormal returns 
around repurchase announcements in order to determine the extent to which the signaling 
hypothesis can be tested in light of the competing theories. They argue that the unique 
structure of REITs (in particular the restriction on paying out 95% of taxable income as 
dividends) makes two competing hypotheses dominate over the alternatives.
Ghosh, Harding, Sezer, and Sirmans (2008) address REIT repurchases from a different 
perspective. Using repurchases announcements from 1997 to 1999, they separate REITs into 
a group that did buybacks and another with no buybacks. They then use a Logit framework 
to show, consistent with Kahle (2002) and others, that option compensation increases the 
possibility of a buyback. Neither of these papers directly address the over-investment issue.
3 Data and Empirical Approach
The basic empirical approach follows Fenn and Liang (2001) and others by employing Logit 
and Tobit models to determine the influence of various possible repurchase motives on the 
decision to buy back shares. The unique aspect of our analysis is that, in addition to the 
typical controls used in related buyback studies, we use the cap rate as a possible explanatory 
variable.
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3.1 Repurchases
Although a common variable of interest, the actual value of shares repurchased is not a 
straight-forward variable to measure. The most accurate measure is the actual shares repur­
chased multiplied by the average price of repurchased shares that is reported in the firm’s 
financial statements. Unfortunately detailed disclosure of repurchase activity has only been 
a requirement since 2004. In a hand collected sample of firms, Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2009) 
horse race various measures of shares repurchases against the measure of share repurchases 
made in the firms’ financial statements. They show that the line item ’’ shares repurchased” 
from the cash flow statement is the best proxy for this measure once it has been adjusted 
for preferred stock repurchases.
In order to extend our sample to before 2004, we employ a hybrid measure of share 
repurchases. Where available, we obtain from SNL the number of shares repurchased and 
the average price of repurchased shares from the firm’s 10-K. When these variables are 
available, the dollar value of share repurchases is the product of these two variables. When 
these variables are not available, we use the line item common shares repurchased from the 
cash flow statement.17 Where no data is reported in SNL, we examine the firm’s 10-K and 
either verify that there were no share repurchases made during the year or reconstruct the 
amount of share repurchases from the information in the 10-K.18
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of stock repurchases made by 125 REITs between 
1996 and 2008. Repurchases are measured as the dollar value of share repurchases made 
during the year, divided by the market capitalization of the firm at the start of the year and 
are reported in percentages. Of the 125 firms in our sample, 89 repurchased stock during
17REITs typically report both common and preferred stock repurchased in the cash flow statement. SNL 
collects these line items separately, so no adjustment is necessary for preferred stock repurchases.
18A blank line item in SNL is caused by the absence of the line item in the firm’s statement of cash 
flows. This can either be due to the firm not conducting any repurchase activity during the year or SNL not 
recording the line item because the firm aggregated common and preferred share repurchases. By examining 
the discussion in the 10-K we were able to distinguish the amounts due to common and preferred share 
repurchases.
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the sample period so it does not appear that repurchases are driven by a few firms. Overall, 
the mean value of repurchases is 0.88% which is lower than the value reported for studies 
focusing on non-REITs.19 Due to their dividend payout requirement, REITs are likely to 
have far less free capital than regular corporations, which would explain the lower overall 
level of repurchases.20 Even though the average repurchase is lower, Table 1 shows that 
there is considerable variation in the amount repurchased by both time and firm. In fact, 
the maximum repurchase in any given year is quite large, suggesting that REITs do at times 
undertake large repurchase activity. Given that these firms are constrained by their dividend 
payout requirement, any results we do find are likely to be more pronounced in a sample of 
regular corporations that do not face this constraint.
3.2 Investment Opportunities
A  poor investment opportunity set is a common explanation for repurchase decisions. When 
faced with bad investment opportunities, managers should return capital to investors rather 
than invest in poor projects. The difficulty the prior literature has faced is that in general 
the researcher cannot observe the firm’s investment opportunity set. As such various proxies 
have been used to indirectly measure the firm’s investment opportunity set.21 We overcome 
this problem by examining a set of firms whose assets trade in public and private markets. 
A REIT’s main asset is a portfolio of properties. These properties trade directly in private 
markets as well as through public markets via trading in the REITs themselves. By obtain­
ing pricing information from the underlying real estate markets and relating these market
transactions to the REIT’s portfolio, we are able to construct the investment opportunity
19See, for example, Fenn and Liang (2001).
20NAREIT reports that the average dividend yield for equity REITs over the sample period was 6.16%. 
Aggregating this with our repurchases data gives an average total payout of 7.06% which is considerably 
higher than the total payout reported by Fenn and Liang (2001) of 2.5% or Jagannathan, Stephens, and 
Weisbach (2000) of 3%.
21See Gaver and Gaver (1993) for a discussion.
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set that the REIT faces at a given point in time.
The metric we use to measure the investment opportunity in the underlying real estate 
market is the Capitalization Rate, or cap rate. The cap rate - a property’s Net Operating 
Income (NOI) divided by its transaction price - is a standard valuation metric in real estate.22 
Since NOI is the property equivalent of Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and 
Amortization (EBITDA), by definition the cap rate is equivalent to pre-tax Return on Assets.
Although the cap rate is not the property IRR, at a theoretical level it is possible to 
decompose the IRR into the cap rate plus expected NOI growth using a perpetual growth 
model. From a practical perspective we know that real estate investors’ cap rate and IRR 
expectations are highly correlated. An examination of cap rates and expected IRRs obtained 
from surveys conducted by PWC Korpacz shows that these two measures are highly corre­
lated. For Industrial properties the correlation is 86%, for Multifamily it is 97%, for Office 
it is 92% and for Retail it is 98%. So although we do not have IRRs, the measure we do 
have is very highly correlated with expected returns.23
We obtain transactional cap rates from CoStar and Real Capital Analytics, the two 
leading industry sources for such data, for the period 1995 to 2008. In order to make the 
properties comparable to the underlying REIT portfolios, we place 4 filters on the transac­
tions data. First, we limit the sample to core property types (Office, Industrial, Multifamily 
and Retail.) The reason for including only these four property types is simply one of prac­
ticality. Other property types, such as Hotel and Health Care, do not experience frequent 
enough transactions to create an accurate time series of cap rates for these property types 
across different locations. Also, since REITs tend to focus solely on core property types 
or solely on specialty property types, aside from Hotel and Health Care REITs which we 
exclude from the sample, we are able to obtain very good matches to the REITs’ portfolios
22See Brueggeman and Fisher (2008), for a textbook treatment.
23 The reason we do not use the Korpacz IRRs for the study is due to the limited geographic dispersion 
available in these data.
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with just these four property types. Second, the reported cap rate has to be greater that 
1%.24 Third, the price of the property has to be greater than $1 million.25 Finally, the 
transaction cannot be a distressed sale.
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the cap rate data by year and property 
type. Overall there were 101,594 property transactions in the sample. 11,752 of these were 
Industrial, 46,218 were Multifamily, 17,398 were Office and 26,226 were Retail. On average, 
Industrial properties experienced the highest average cap rate at 8.92%, then Office at 8.80%, 
then Retail at 8.70% and finally Multifamily at 7.76%. The minimum and maximum cap 
rates show that there is a large degree of dispersion in property cap rates both by time 
and location. This dispersion in cap rates suggests that any property investor investing in 
different property types and locations will face differing investment opportunity sets.
In order to create an accurate investment opportunity set we exploit the portfolio char­
acteristics of the REIT industry. If REITs held properties of all different property types in 
all locations, then they would all face the same investment opportunity set. Fortunately for 
our study, REITs tend to be focused by property type or location or both.26 This makes 
sense given the potential informational advantages of specializing by property type, location 
or both. The focused nature of REITs also provides a logical way of describing a REIT's 
investment opportunity set. When considering a new marginal project, a REIT is likely to 
consider a property in a market and property type in which it already operates. In this 
sense the current geographic and property type profile of the REIT provides a logical filter 
with which to select projects that the REIT might undertake. Thus by examining a REIT's
24Less than 1% of the cap rates in the sample are less than 3%. Our results are not sensitive to using this 
cutoff.
25The average property in the sample has a price of $10.3 million with the Office having the largest average 
price of $22.7 million, then Retail with an average of $8.1 million, then Multifamily with an average of $7.7 
million and finally Industrial with an average of $7.06 million. smallest properties in the sample are $1 
million in value the largest is $5.4 billion.
26For example, Washington REIT invests in multiple property types, but all within driving distance of 
Washington, DC. Simon Property Group invests only in retail properties, but invests across the US. Nearly 
all of SL Green’s portfolio consists of Office properties in Manhattan.
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portfolio at a point in time and matching this to transactional cap rates observed in those 
markets, we can measure the investment opportunities that the REIT faces at a given point 
in time.
Calculating a REIT's investment opportunity set is a three step process. First, for each 
Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA), State, NCREIF region and then Nationally, we calcu­
late the average transactional cap rate for four different property types Office, Industrial, 
Multifamily and Retail.27 Thus for each year, we have a measure of what cap rate an investor 
would face in each property type in each given geographic region. Second, for each REIT we 
build a geographic profile of the REIT’s portfolio for each year. We obtain the REIT’s prop­
erty portfolio information from SNL, which provides details of property type and location. 
Finally, for each year we then match the REIT’s property portfolio by property type with 
the transactional cap rate from Step 1, first at the CBSA level, then the State level, then at 
the NCREIF region level and finally at the National level until all properties are matched. 
Of the 217,579 property/years in the REITs’ portfolios, 166,366 (76%) were matched at the 
CBSA level, 28,575 (13%) were matched at the State level, 20,664 (9%) were matched at the 
NCREIF region level and 1,974 (2%) were matched at the National level.28
Having matched each REIT property to a transactional cap rate in each year, we calculate 
Average Cap Rate, which is the average of these cap rates across the REIT’s portfolio each 
year. This provides a measure of the average return on assets that a REIT would face on a 
typical project in its portfolio. Since repurchase decisions are likely to be made throughout 
the year, in our empirical specification for repurchases made in year t, we use the average
27NCREIF divides the US into 8 regions: North-East (ME, VT, NH, NY, CT, RI, MA, PA, NJ), Mid-East 
(MD, WV, VA, KY, NC, SC, DC, DE), South-East (TN, GA, FL, AL, MS), East North Central (MI, IL, OH, 
IN, WI), West North Central (MN, IA, MO, KS, SD, ND, NE), South West (TX, OK AR, LA), Mountain 
(ID, WY, UT, CO, NM, AZ) and Pacific (WA, OR, CA, AK, HI).
28The data from CoStar and Real Capital Analytics are heavily biased towards larger metro areas, so it is 
unlikely they are representative of cap rates in all US locations. Fortunately REIT portfolios are biased in 
the same manner, with REITs mainly investing larger metro areas, which is why we are able to match the 
majority of the sample at the CBSA level.
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cap rate from year t — 1. As a robustness check, we calculate Average Cap Rate - BBB, the 
spread between the average cap rate and the BBB yield. This variable is quite commonly 
used in REIT analysis to gauge investment opportunities. The intuition behind it is quite 
simple. Most REITs trade at BBB credit ratings, so the BBB yield is approximately equal 
to the REIT’s cost of debt. Since cap rates are the cash yield for the property, the spread 
between the average cap rate and the BBB yield measures the degree to which the property 
can cover its cost of debt. Obviously when Average Cap Rate - BBB is close to zero or 
negative, the property isn’t generating sufficient cash flow to cover any debt, indicating a 
poor investment climate.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of Average Cap Rate and Average Cap Rate - BBB 
for the 125 REITs in our sample between 1996 and 2008. The most noticeable result from 
Table 3 is that there is both cross-sectional and time series variation in the investment 
opportunity set that REITs face. This indicates that the variation observed in transactional 
cap rates in Table 2 has not been averaged out by the composition of the REITs’ portfolios. 
It also shows that REITs are not all facing the same investment opportunity set, which is 
critical for our study. On average there is a 347 b.p. difference between the cap rate faced 
by the REITs with the best and worst investment opportunity sets.
The overall pattern of cap rates reported in Table 3 is quite interesting. The marked 
decline in cap rates after 2001 coincides with a large influx of capital into commercial real 
estate. While this resulted in an overall decline in the level of cap rates, the spread between 
the average cap rate and the BBB yield indicates that the average cost of debt for REITs 
was also declining at the same time. Most noticeably this spread is quite low and even 
negative in the latter part of the sample, which is consistent with the anecdotal evidence 
that commercial real estate was over priced in the latter part of the sample period.
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3.3 Other Characteristics
In our empirical design we control for other potential explanations of repurchase behav­
ior posited in the prior literature. In particular we control for stock options, agency cost 
explanations of repurchases, leverage, undervaluation, external financing costs.
3.3.1 Stock Options
Executive compensation is a factor potentially affecting repurchase behavior.29 Managers’ 
incentives can be aligned with shareholders’ interests by awarding managers stock options. 
Fenn and Liang (2001) argue that because of aligned incentives, managers would be more 
likely to pay out free cash flow to investors rather than invest in bad projects. Thus we 
would expect a positive relationship between stock options and repurchases.
Another channel through which stock options could affect repurchases is by making re­
purchases preferred to dividends as a mechanism to return capital to investors. Lambert, 
Lanen, and Larker (1989) argue that since executive stock options (like all call options) are 
negatively impacted by dividends, if managers wish to maintain the same overall payout 
ratio they would prefer repurchases to dividends. Once again we would expect a positive 
relationship between the level of option compensation and repurchase activity.
Options data are obtained from two sources. First, where available we obtain both 
unexercisable and unexercised but exercisable options from EXECUCOMP. EXECUCOMP’s 
coverage of the REIT universe is quite limited, so where data are missing we hand collect 
the options data from the firm’s proxy statements. Following Kahle (2002), we create two 
variables: Unexercisable Options, which is equal to outstanding unexercisable unexercised 
options divided by total shares outstanding, and Exercisable Options, which is equal to 
unexercised exercisable options divided by total shares outstanding.
29See Kahle (2002) for a detailed discussion.
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3.3.2 Agency Costs
Under agency cost explanations of repurchases, we would expect to observe firms with high 
levels of free cash flow repurchasing stock. By repurchasing stock the firm reduces Jensen 
(1986) style free cash flow agency problems. We employ two variables to proxy for free 
cash flow. First, Free Cash Flow is the firm’s funds from operations divided by total assets. 
We use funds from operations because it is the standard measure of cash flow in the REIT 
industry.30 The second variable, also employed by Dittmar (2000) is Free Cash, which is 
the REIT’s cash and marketable securities divided by total assets.31 In both cases we would 
expect to observe a positive relationship with repurchases.
3.3.3 Leverage
Firm leverage may also affect repurchase decisions. Since repurchasing stock will increase 
leverage, firms with high leverage are less likely repurchase stock since higher leverage will 
potentially increase expected bankruptcy costs. Leverage may also affect repurchase deci­
sions because it reduces free cash flows.32 Leverage could also increase the volatility of the 
firm’s free cash flow making it less likely to make repurchases because of a precautionary 
savings motive. In each case, we expected a negative relationship between share repurchases 
and leverage. We calculate the firm’s leverage as total debt plus preferred stock divided 
by total capital (market value of equity plus the book value of debt and the book value of 
preferred stock.) Leverage is equal to the firm’s leverage minus the average leverage in the 
industry during the year.
30FFO is essentially equal to a REIT’s net income, excluding gains or losses from sales of property, and 
adding back real estate depreciation.
31 Results are similar if we use cash and marketable securities plus unused credit lines divided by total 
assets.
32See Jensen (1986).
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3.3.4 Undervaluation
Managers may choose to repurchase stock when the firm is undervalued. This is in fact 
a common explanation of the market’s reaction to share repurchase announcements. To 
capture any potential undervaluation, we include the market to book ratio in our empirical 
specification. Market to Book is calculated as the firm’s book value of assets minus book 
value of equity plus market value of equity all divided by book value of assets.
3.3.5 External Funding Costs
Firms that face lower external funding costs are likely to be less constrained in their ability 
to repurchase stock since future funding short falls can be raised at low cost in the future. 
We proxy external funding costs using Total Assets, the log of the firm’s total assets. As 
argued by Smith and Watts (1992) and Opler and Titman (1993) larger firms are likely to 
have more stable cash flows and lower asymmetric information. The latter is also likely 
to be true for REITs, since as Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (2009) show, firm size is a key 
determinant of analyst coverage.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the independent variables in the analysis. The sam­
ple is bifurcated into repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms and a t test of the difference 
in means between repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms is reported in the right most 
column. Consistent with the notion that poor investment opportunities lead to higher re­
purchases, we observe that the average cap rate and the spread between the average cap 
rate and BBB yield is higher for non-repurchasing than repurchasing firms. So at least in a 
univariate analysis their appears to be some support for this hypothesis.
While the average value of Exercisable Options and Unexercisable Options is larger for
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repurchasing than non-repurchasing firms, the difference is not statistically significant. The 
average values of 1.63% and 1.02% for non-repurchasing and 1.66% and 1.17% for repur­
chasing firms are similar to the averages reported in Ghosh, Harding, Sezer, and Sirmans 
(2008).
A  relationship that runs counter to expectations are the variables related to agency costs. 
The average values of Free Cash Flow and Free Cash are higher for non-repurchasing firms 
especially for Free Cash. If firms with higher free cash flow pay out this cash flow to investors 
in the form of repurchases in order to avoid agency costs, we would expect to see a positive 
relationship with repurchases.
The average market to book ratio for non-repurchasing firms is 1.32 and the average 
for repurchasing firms in 1.21. This difference is highly statistically significant and if one 
assumes firms with lower market to book ratios are more likely to be undervalued, then the 
relationship is consistent with the undervaluation hypothesis.
Finally, repurchasing firms are larger than non-repurchasing firms. This is consistent 
with larger firms facing lower external financing costs and as such being less constrained in 
their ability to repurchase stock.
Table 5 reports a correlation matrix of the independent variables. As expected, Free 
Cash Flow has a strong negative correlation with Leverage of -0.53. This is consistent with 
leverage being a mechanism to reduce free cash flow. Interestingly, Average Cap Rate and 
Market to Book have a negative correlation of -0.34. This can be explained by the fact that 
when cap rates are low, property prices are high which should be reflected in the market 
value of the firm. It also suggests that they are capturing different effects.
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4 Estimation Results
We examine the relationship between investment opportunities and share repurchases in two 
ways. First, we treat share repurchases as a binary outcome and estimate the relationship 
between repurchasing shares and the independent variables in a Logit framework. Second, 
we treat share repurchases as a censored variable and estimate a Tobit model of share 
repurchases on the independent variables.
Table 6 reports estimation results for the random effects Logit model. The dependent 
variable takes the value of 1 if Repurchases is greater than zero and 0 otherwise. To aid 
interpretation, we report the change in the probability of repurchasing shares for a one 
standard deviation increase in the independent variables. Marginal effects are reported in 
percentages.
The marginal effects in Table 6 support the hypothesis that poor investment opportunities 
lead to more repurchases. Measuring the investment opportunity set using Average Cap Rate, 
we observe that a firm is 6.32% less likely to repurchase stock if the average cap rate faced by 
the firm increases by one standard deviation, or 132 b.p. Turning to Average Cap Rate - BBB 
we observe similar support. A one standard deviation increase in the spread between the 
average cap rate and the BBB yields makes a firm 8.26% less likely to repurchase stock. The 
strong statistical significance of these marginal effects demonstrates that a firm's investment 
opportunity does indeed play a role in the firm's choice to repurchase shares.
Consistent with the prior literature, we find that the market to book ratio has a strong 
negative relationship with share repurchases. A one standard deviation increase in the market 
to book ratio makes the firm approximately 14% less likely to repurchase stock. Interpreting 
high market to book ratios as a sign of possible overvaluation, this result is consistent with 
the undervaluation hypothesis.
External funding costs also appear to play a role in the firm's decision to repurchase stock.
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Consistent with larger firms being less constrained in their ability raise future funding, larger 
firms are significantly more likely to repurchase stock. A one standard deviation increase 
in total assets makes the firm approximately 14% more likely to repurchase stock. The 
magnitude of this marginal effect is not surprising given that REITs are a capital constrained 
sample of firms. As such it is natural to expect that the ability to raise future capital is a 
key determinant of the decision to repurchase stock today. Note that our measures of option 
compensation are never significant, which does not confirm the findings of Ghosh, Harding, 
Sezer, and Sirmans (2008).
Table 7 reports estimation results for a random effects Tobit model of Repurchases on the 
independent variables. Once again, to aid interpretation we report the marginal effects as the 
change in the dependent variable for a one standard deviation increase in the independent 
variable. Like in the Logit estimation in Table 6, there is a statistically significant marginal 
effect for Average Cap Rate and Average Cap Rate-BBB in Table 7. A one standard deviation 
increase in the average cap rate faced by the REIT leads to a 21 b.p. decrease in repurchases. 
In terms of the spread between average cap rates and the BBB yield, a one standard deviation 
decrease in the spread leads to a 26 b.p. increase in repurchases. Given that the average 
level of repurchases in the sample is 90 b.p. this is quite a large effect.
Once again we also find that undervaluation and external financing costs have a significant 
impact on share repurchases. A one standard deviation increase in the market to book ratio 
leads to approximately a 60 b.p. decrease in repurchases, while a one standard deviation 
increase in total assets leads to approximately a 40 b.p. increase in repurchases. Unlike in the 
Logit estimation, stock options also appear to impact the magnitude of shares repurchased 
with Unexercised Options having a statistically significant marginal effect. Interestingly, in 
neither estimation does Free Cash Flow or Free Cash appear to be statistically significant. 
This may be due to high payout requirements effectively diminishing the magnitude of this 
repurchases channel compared to regular corporations.
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5 Conclusion
Previous studies on buyback behavior have demonstrated three general points. (i) Over­
valuation plays a significant role in the repurchase decision: firms tend to buy back shares 
when they believe the shares are undervalued. (ii) Increases in option compensation tend 
to lead to more repurchase activity. (iii) Using market-to-book to proxy for investment 
opportunities, there is indirect evidence that the firm’s opportunity set can influence the 
share repurchase decision.
This study, while offering evidence on each of these three issues, is novel in its much 
more direct investigation of point (iii). Using data on cap rates (a REIT’s projected return 
on assets for a given property) we are able to construct a series of potential project returns 
for the 125 REITs in our sample; i.e., an approximation to the REIT’s opportunity set at 
a given point in time. Thereby we address more precisely the over-investment hypothesis, 
firms repurchasing shares in lieu of investing in negative NPV projects, by linking these 
investment returns (as well as these returns in excess of a REIT’s cost of borrowing) with 
buyback activity over time.
We find significant evidence for the over-investment hypothesis: REITs increase their 
repurchase activity significantly when cap rates are low and decrease it significantly when 
cap rates are high. This is noteworthy since our sample of REITs (because of institutional 
constraints on dividend payout) have far less divertible cash flow than industrial firms. Thus 
we would expect these results to be even stronger for non-REITs. We are also able to 
distinguish this effect from the over-valuation effect. We provide support for this hypothesis 
by using market-to-book in our Logit and Tobit analysis and estimating the correct negative 
impact on buyback activity: high market to book REITs are less likely to repurchase shares.
With regard to finding (ii), we find no support for the hypothesis that option compen­
sation is a significant influence on REIT buyback activity. This result may be due to the
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fact that the average level of repurchases in our sample is lower than corresponding levels 
for industrial firms.
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Table reports descriptive statistics for share repurchases by the 125 REITs in the sample between 1996 and 
2008. Repurchases is measured as the dollar value of common share repurchases during the year, divided by 
market capitalization at the start of the year. Where available, dollar value of common share repurchases is 
measured as common shares repurchased multiplied by average price of common shares repurchased reported 
in the company’s financial statement. If these variables are not available, the dollar value of repurchases 
is measured as “Common Stock Repurchased” reported in the firm’s statement of cash flows. Repurchases 
data were obtained from SNL. Shares outstanding is from CRSP. Repurchases are reported in percentages.
Table 1: Repurchases
Year Firms Mean Std Min Max
1996 76 0.1 0.46 0 2.48
1997 79 0.05 0.26 0 1.7
1998 95 0.62 2.05 0 13.36
1999 97 2.14 4.72 0 33.9
2000 93 2 3.35 0 17.83
2001 92 1.5 3.71 0 20.41
2002 90 0.82 2.27 0 18.53
2003 90 0.73 3.06 0 26.5
2004 92 0.33 1.28 0 8.92
2005 84 0.64 1.85 0 8.65
2006 76 0.69 1.86 0 11.27
2007 74 1.25 2.55 0 16.24
2008 74 0.52 1.84 0 14.27
Average 86 0.88 2.25 0 14.93
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Table reports descriptive statistics of capitalization rates for 101,594 property transactions in the CoStar 
and Real Capital Analytics databases. Panel A reports statistics for Industrial and Multifamily properties 
while Panel B reports statistics for Office and Retail properties. Properties were excluded if the transaction 
cap rate was less than 1%, the price was below $1 million or the transaction was a distressed sale.
Table 2: Capitalization Rates
Panel A: Industrial and Multifamily
Industrial Multifamily
Year Obs Mean Std Min Max Obs Mean Std Min Max
1995 363 10.26 2.25 4.01 24.39 754 9.24 2 3.05 23.15
1996 537 10.32 1.94 5.62 23.66 1099 9.47 2.11 2 19.44
1997 527 10.05 1.69 4.52 23.06 1642 9.24 1.98 2 18.84
1998 561 9.57 1.68 4.01 15.34 2002 8.83 1.93 2.83 17.78
1999 740 9.66 1.82 4.22 20.87 2513 8.8 1.92 1.41 17.68
2000 721 9.68 1.81 1.22 19.47 2823 8.6 1.98 1.12 17.82
2001 767 9.59 1.6 3.03 18.03 3266 8.55 1.86 2.04 17.48
2002 712 9.24 1.56 1.29 15.04 4132 7.92 1.77 3.17 15.81
2003 937 8.87 1.59 1.94 18 4634 7.21 1.78 1.5 18.3
2004 1048 8.2 1.63 3.16 15 5738 6.53 1.79 2.08 16.96
2005 1277 7.76 1.71 2 15.49 6052 5.98 1.8 1.18 23.24
2006 1377 7.22 1.47 2 14.5 4952 5.99 1.74 1.2 23.97
2007 1513 7.08 1.43 2.6 15 4559 6.04 1.64 1.62 22.37
2008 672 7.34 1.53 2 12.27 2052 6.18 1.67 1.59 15
Panel B: Office and Retail
Office Retail
Year Obs Mean Std Min Max Obs Mean Std Min Max
1995 294 10.38 2.3 4.18 19.12 321 10.26 2 4.85 23.31
1996 494 10.34 2.26 3.86 26.01 500 10.47 2.22 3.62 20.83
1997 699 9.65 1.82 3.73 16.78 762 10.14 1.77 3.34 18.74
1998 819 9.42 1.8 3.2 16.48 876 9.65 1.7 4.06 18.06
1999 1074 9.77 1.78 3.49 23.37 1007 9.67 1.75 3 17.69
2000 1166 9.67 1.65 2.48 15.71 1120 9.47 1.7 3.51 18
2001 1170 9.65 1.72 2.31 20.89 1367 9.39 1.61 2.05 17
2002 1308 9.28 1.66 1.84 25.11 1912 9.05 1.49 3.57 14.88
2003 1441 8.82 1.56 2.62 14.82 2408 8.42 1.53 2.68 16
2004 1827 8.1 1.66 2.2 16.14 2770 7.71 1.6 2.45 15
2005 2004 7.42 1.6 1.3 14.98 3196 7.1 1.47 1.87 20.8
2006 2015 7 1.45 2 14 3682 6.79 1.29 1.98 14.52
2007 2183 6.7 1.44 2 13.2 4360 6.79 1.27 1.2 24.53
2008 904 7.01 1.48 1.6 13.6 1945 6.94 1.27 1.58 13.96
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Table 3: Investment Opportunity Set
Table reports descriptive statistics of REIT portfolio cap rates for the 125 REITs in our sample between 1996 and 2008. For each year, the 
properties in the REIT’s portfolio are matched by property type and location (CBSA, State, NCREIF region and Nationally) to transaction 
based cap rates from CoStar and Real Capital Analytics. Average Cap Rate is the average cap rate across the REIT’s properties in a given 
year. Average Cap Rate - BBB is the spread between Average Cap Rate and the yield on BBB debt. Cap rates are reported in percentages.
Average Cap Rate Average Cap Rate - BBB
Year Firms Mean Std Min Max Range Mean Std Min Max Range
1996 76 10.44 0.6 8.78 12.31 3.53 2.39 0.60 0.73 4.26 3.53
1997 79 10.43 0.6 8.6 11.74 3.15 2.56 0.60 0.73 3.87 3.15
1998 95 9.99 0.45 8.14 10.91 2.77 2.77 0.45 0.92 3.69 2.77
1999 97 9.9 0.56 8.17 12.22 4.05 2.02 0.56 0.29 4.34 4.05
2000 93 9.91 0.39 8.04 10.73 2.69 1.54 0.39 -0.33 2.36 2.69
2001 92 9.8 0.53 7.77 10.94 3.17 1.85 0.53 -0.18 2.99 3.17
2002 90 9.62 0.5 7.87 10.9 3.03 1.82 0.50 0.07 3.10 3.03
2003 90 9.24 0.58 7.25 11.59 4.34 2.48 0.58 0.49 4.83 4.34
2004 92 8.64 0.61 6.49 10.43 3.93 2.25 0.61 0.10 4.04 3.93
2005 84 7.99 0.61 5.78 9.78 3.99 1.93 0.61 -0.28 3.72 3.99
2006 76 7.46 0.65 5.34 9.02 3.68 0.98 0.65 -1.14 2.54 3.68
2007 74 6.98 0.61 5.14 8.36 3.22 0.50 0.61 -1.34 1.88 3.22
2008 74 6.76 0.62 5.12 8.74 3.61 -0.68 0.62 -2.32 1.30 3.61
Average 86 9.01 0.56 7.12 10.59 3.47 1.72 0.56 -0.17 3.30 3.47
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
l>Goo
Table reports descriptive statistics for the independent variables in the analysis. Data are for the 125 REITs in the sample between 1996 and 
2008. Average Cap Rate is the REIT’s average portfolio cap rate (in percentages), Average Cap Rate - BBB is the REIT’s average portfolio cap 
rate minus the yield on BBB debt (in percentages). Exercisable Options is unexercised but exercisable options divided by shares outstanding 
(in percentages) and Unexercisable Options are unexercisable options divided by shares outstanding (in percentages). Free Cash Flow is funds 
from operations (FFO) divided by total assets (in percentages) and Free Cash is cash and marketable securities divided by total assets (in 
percentages). Leverage is the difference between the REIT’s total debt plus preferred stock to total capital (in percentages) and the average 
Industry total debt plus preferred stock to total capital (in percentages). Market to Book is book assets minus book equity plus market value of 
equity all divided by total assets and Total Assets is the log of total book assets. Average Cap Rate and Average Cap Rate - BBB are calculated 
using data from CoStar and Real Capital Analytics, while all other data are from SNL except the options data which is from EXECUCOMP 
or the firm’s proxy statements.
No Repurchase Repurchase
Variable Obs Mean Std Min Max Obs Mean Std Min Max t test
Average Cap Rate 751 9.15 1.30 5.34 12.31 361 8.93 1.37 5.12 11.43 -2.54
Average Cap Rate - BBB 751 1.88 1.00 -1.64 4.83 361 1.54 1.09 -2.32 4.04 -5.16
Exercisable Options 751 1.63 2.24 0 17.9 361 1.66 1.74 0 8.31 0.23
Unexercisable Options 751 1.02 1.5 0 21.75 361 1.17 1.47 0 11.21 1.55
Free Cash Flow 751 5.73 2.61 -5.45 26.7 361 5.63 2.31 -9.32 12.6 -0.64
Free Cash 751 11.47 9.48 0.29 94.3 361 9.5 6.03 0.26 40.56 -3.61
Leverage 751 -0.57 14.41 -46.31 40.5 361 0.04 14.04 -43.43 42.21 0.66
Market to Book 751 1.32 0.33 0.67 2.96 361 1.21 0.24 0.47 2.22 -6.08
Total Assets 751 13.78 1.35 8.26 17.18 361 14.36 1.13 10.78 17.07 7.06
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix
Table reports correlations between the independent variables in the analysis. Data are for the 125 REITs in the sample between 1996 and 2008. 
Average Cap Rate is the REIT’s average portfolio cap rate (in percentages), Average Cap Rate - BBB is the REIT’s average portfolio cap rate 
minus the yield on BBB debt (in percentages). Exercisable Options is unexercised but exercisable options divided by shares outstanding (in 
percentages) and Unexercisable Options are unexercisable options divided by shares outstanding (in percentages). Free Cash Flow is funds 
from operations (FFO) divided by total assets (in percentages) and Free Cash is cash and marketable securities divided by total assets (in 
percentages). Leverage is the difference between the REIT’s total debt plus preferred stock to total capital (in percentages) and the average 
Industry total debt plus preferred stock to total capital (in percentages). Market to Book is book assets minus book equity plus market value of 
equity all divided by total assets and Total Assets is the log of total book assets. Average Cap Rate and Average Cap Rate - BBB are calculated 
using data from CoStar and Real Capital Analytics, while all other data are from SNL except the options data which is from EXECUCOMP 
or the firm’s proxy statements.
Average 
Cap Rate
Avg Cap 
Rate - BBB
Exercisable
Options
Unexercisable
Options
Free Cash 
Flow
Free
Cash
Leverage Market to 
Book
Total
Assets
Average Cap Rate 1
Avg Cap Rate - BBB 0.83 1
Exercisable Options 0.15 0.08 1
Unexercisable Options 0.28 0.17 0.23 1
Free Cash Flow 0.16 0.1 -0.1 0.02 1
Free Cash -0.05 -0.02 0 -0.05 0.05 1
Leverage 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.07 -0.53 -0.3 1
Market to Book -0.34 -0.21 -0.08 -0.11 0.25 0.25 -0.38 1
Total Assets -0.39 -0.31 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.22 -0.05 0.08 1
Table reports estimation results for a random-effect panel Logit model. The dependent variable is equal to 
one if the firm repurchased shares during the year and zero otherwise. Marginal effects are reported for a one 
standard deviation change in the independent variable and are reported in percentages. Data are for the 125 
REITs in the sample between 1996 and 2008. Average Cap Rate is the REIT’s average portfolio cap rate (in 
percentages), Average Cap Rate - BBB is the REIT’s average portfolio cap rate minus the yield on BBB debt 
(in percentages). Exercisable Options is unexercised but exercisable options divided by shares outstanding 
(in percentages) and Unexercisable Options are unexercisable options divided by shares outstanding (in 
percentages). Free Cash Flow is funds from operations (FFO) divided by total assets (in percentages) and 
Free Cash is cash and marketable securities divided by total assets (in percentages). Leverage is the difference 
between the REIT’s total debt plus preferred stock to total capital (in percentages) and the average Industry 
total debt plus preferred stock to total capital (in percentages). Market to Book is book assets minus book 
equity plus market value of equity all divided by total assets and Total Assets is the log of total book assets. 
Average Cap Rate and Average Cap Rate - BBB are calculated using data from CoStar and Real Capital 
Analytics, while all other data are from SNL except the options data which is from EXECUCOMP or the 
firm’s proxy statements.
Table 6: Decision to Repurchase
Variable Marginal Effect t-stat Marginal Effect t-stat
Average Cap Rate 
Average Cap Rate - BBB
-6.32 -2.72
-8.26 -4.45
Exercisable Options 2.95 1.54 2.66 1.39
Unexercisable Options 2.9 1.64 2.45 1.43
Free Cash Flow 2.15 0.88 2.13 0.9
Free Cash -3.18 -1.52 -3.16 -1.51
Leverage -3.21 -1.23 -2.42 -0.93
Market to Book -14.64 -5.22 -13.19 -5.27
Total Assets 14.8 4.86 14.40 5.1
Obs 1112 1112
P 0.33 0.34
x 2 (p=0) 82.69 84.78
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Table reports estimation results for a random effects panel Tobit model. The dependent variable Repur­
chases, is equal to the dollar amount of common shares repurchased during the year divided by market 
capitalization at the start of the year multiplied by 100. To aid interpretation, marginal effects are reported 
for a one standard deviation change in the independent variable. Data are for the 125 REITs in the sample 
between 1996 and 2008. Average Cap Rate is the REIT’s average portfolio cap rate (in percentages), Average 
Cap Rate - BBB is the REIT’s average portfolio cap rate minus the yield on BBB debt (in percentages). 
Exercisable Options is unexercised but exercisable options divided by shares outstanding (in percentages) 
and Unexercisable Options are unexercisable options divided by shares outstanding (in percentages). Free 
Cash Flow is funds from operations (FFO) divided by total assets (in percentages) and Free Cash is cash 
and marketable securities divided by total assets (in percentages). Leverage is the difference between the 
REIT’s total debt plus preferred stock to total capital (in percentages) and the average Industry total debt 
plus preferred stock to total capital (in percentages). Market to Book is book assets minus book equity plus 
market value of equity all divided by total assets and Total Assets is the log of total book assets. Average 
Cap Rate and Average Cap Rate - BBB are calculated using data from CoStar and Real Capital Analytics, 
while all other data are from SNL except the options data which is from EXECUCOMP or the firm’s proxy 
statements.
Table 7: Amount of Repurchases
Variable Marginal Effect t-stat Marginal Effect t-stat
Average Cap Rate 
Average Cap Rate - BBB
-0.21 -2.66
-0.26 -4.1
Exercisable Options 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.01
Unexercisable Options 0.12 2.09 0.11 1.96
Free Cash Flow 0.07 0.85 0.06 0.79
Free Cash -0.13 -1.7 -0.12 -1.64
Leverage -0.09 -1.03 -0.07 -0.82
Market to Book -0.64 -7.03 -0.60 -7.27
Total Assets 0.41 4.88 0.39 5.04
Obs 1112 1112
Left Censored 751 751
P 0.11 0.1
x 2 (p=0) 33.68 33.29
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